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Acche din 
India’s 2014 general election took place as the country was 
being buffeted by severe economic headwinds. Though the 
incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA) presided over 
the highest rates of economic growth in India’s history dur-
ing its first five years in office, the economy took a turn for 
the worse during its second term. In addition to the impacts 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, a series of policy missteps, 
high-profile corruption scandals and a divided political lead-
ership created a pervasive sense of policy paralysis, leading 
to a collapse of the investment cycle.
 By August 2013, less than one year before the gen-
eral election, a Morgan Stanley research report dubbed 
India one of the “Fragile Five” emerging market countries 
likely to be hit hard as the US Federal Reserve began its 
gradual withdrawal of monetary stimulus. Indeed, per-
sistently high inflation, slowing growth and twin cur-
rent account and fiscal deficits made India especially vul-
nerable to the vagaries of the global economy.
 In contrast to the prevailing order and backed by an 
impressive record of sustaining economic growth and 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi entered office with a historic politi-
cal mandate. For the first time in thirty years, a single party won a majority of 
seats in the lower house of Parliament (Lok Sabha). However, Modi faces sky-
high expectations to fulfill his campaign promises of getting India’s economy 
back on track. Eighteen months into his government’s term and in the wake 
of electoral defeats in the states of Delhi and Bihar, questions are being raised 
about its economic performance. While the Modi government has stabilized 
India’s macroeconomy and announced a series of incremental economic re-
forms, more sweeping changes have fallen victim to India’s nettlesome do-
mestic politics, including roadblocks within the ruling alliance. 
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dia’s macroeconomy. In truth, India’s stabilization pro-
gram began in the waning months of UPA’s tenure when 
then-Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram and 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan 
championed a series of remedial steps to get India’s eco-
nomic house in order. The BJP government, for its part, 
reaffirmed this commitment to stabilization. 
 In the two years since India was added to the ignomin-
ious “Fragile Five” club, it has engineered a remarkable 
reversal of fortune (Figure 1). According to its September 
2015 World Economic Outlook, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) reported that India is now the  fastest 
growing major economy in the world, surging ahead of 
China. In 2015, the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) is expected to grow by 7.5 percent as China’s dips 
to 6.8 percent and “emerging and developing Asia” as a 
whole cools to 6.5 percent. Consumer price inflation, long 
attracting investment during a decade as chief minister 
of the state of Gujarat, Modi positioned himself as the 
experienced, decisive leader who could restore acche din 
(good days) to the Indian economy. The centerpiece of 
his Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) 2014 campaign was 
then-candidate Modi’s catchy slogan, Sab ka saath, sab 
ka vikas (Together with all, development for all). The 
antipathy Indian voters experienced towards the ruling 
Congress Party, as well as the latter’s inability to pro-
vide a coherent economic message or project a convinc-
ing prime ministerial candidate, led to the BJP winning 
282 (of 545) seats in the Lok Sabha and the Congress’ 
worst ever performance (a lowly 44 seats).
Macroeconomic stabilization
After assuming office, the Modi government quickly 
racked up one major accomplishment: stabilizing In-
Figure 1: India’s Macroeconomic Trajectory
Source: World Bank; Citigroup
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3A dose of good luck
While it would be churlish to deny the Modi government 
credit for macroeconomic stabilization and resuscitating 
the investment cycle, it would be equally shortsighted 
to dismiss the role of relatively benign global economic 
conditions. For starters, India has benefited from histori-
cally low commodity prices. As a net oil importer, India’s 
fiscal woes are relieved by depressed oil prices, which 
have slashed its import bill and reduced the overall sub-
sidy burden.
 India’s recovery also benefits from the fact that many 
of its peers are encountering severe economic troubles. 
Of the other BRIC economies, Brazil has been contract-
ing since government bonds were downgraded to junk 
status; Russia, stung by low oil prices and economic 
sanctions, is experiencing negative growth; and China’s 
growth is expected to slow considerably as it rebalances 
its economy away from investment and toward domestic 
consumption. The setbacks experienced by India’s peers 
make the country’s economic success shine even bright-
er in comparison.
Creative incrementalism
Many observers have been surprised by how cautiously 
the government has proceeded on the economic reform 
front, given the government’s unique electoral mandate 
and Modi’s campaign promises that he would adminis-
ter “bitter medicine” to the country by taking tough eco-
nomic decisions to right India’s economic affairs. Indeed, 
the Modi government has consciously adopted a policy 
of “creative incrementalism,” rather than move to imple-
ment a series of “big bang” economic reforms that would 
mark a sharp break with the status quo.
The government’s gradualist approach has produced 
a number of important achievements (Figure 2). The 
government lifted caps on foreign direct investment 
in the defense, insurance and railways sectors. It de-
regulated the price of diesel, opened up coal mining to 
above 10 percent, has been cut in half. India’s current ac-
count deficit averaged 3.5 percent of GDP between 2008 
and 2012, but is expected to approach 1 percent this fiscal 
year. While the Modi government has slightly eased the 
pace of fiscal consolidation, the fiscal deficit as a share of 
GDP is expected to be below 4 percent — a sharp reduc-
tion from nearly 6.5 percent in 2009–2010. According to 
an index drawn from daily news reports, economic un-
certainty in India has also dropped markedly since the 
tumultuous period of 2011–2012.
Green shoots?
The rosy picture presented by India’s macroeconomic 
data is complemented by evidence that India’s mori-
bund investment cycle is showing renewed signs of life. 
Consider three indicators. First, one of the most visible 
signs of economic malaise over the past few years has 
been the rising number of capital investment projects 
that had been formally inaugurated by both public and 
private firms but ran into implementation challenges. As 
a share of overall GDP, this stock of “stalled” investment 
projects peaked at 8.5 percent in March 2014. In every 
quarter since (barring the most recent), this share has 
steadily dropped.
 Furthermore, the flow of new investment projects 
has increased steadily, if not slowly, in recent months. 
One underlying driver responsible for reviving the in-
vestment cycle has been an infusion of infrastructure 
spending engineered by the Modi government in its 
2015 budget. The government extended its previous fis-
cal consolidation timeline in the hopes that increased 
public expenditure – with a heavy emphasis on roads 
and railways – would stimulate growth and “crowd in” 
private investment. In the immediate term, that plan ap-
pears to have worked. Over the past year, India has seen 
steady growth in the production of capital goods and a 
modest uptick in the index of industrial production. 
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anvil include legislation to create a common market for 
agricultural produce, a new regulatory reform bill for 
infrastructure, and the streamlining of onerous labor 
laws into four “labor codes” on wages, industrial rela-
tions, social security and working conditions. 
Obstreperous democracy
Given its impressive list of accomplishments to date, the 
Modi government cannot be accused of failing to pursue 
reforms. The question for debate is why its reform pro-
gram has been incremental in nature – far short of the 
“maximum governance, minimum government” Modi 
promised during the 2014 campaign. The most obvious 
answer concerns the multiplicity of veto points that act as 
a check on major policy shifts. For instance, while the BJP 
alliance earned an outright majority in the Lok Sabha, it 
is a distinct minority in the upper house (Rajya Sabha), 
whose assent is necessary for most legislation. Because 
members of the various state assemblies select Rajya Sab-
ha members, the composition of the house changes at a 
glacial pace. For the BJP and its allies to control a majority 
private companies and legislated that all new mining 
licenses be subject to auction. Despite initial skepticism 
about the UPA-designed unique biometric identification 
program known as Aadhaar, it has doubled down on 
the initiative, using the platform to replace graft-prone 
public subsidies with direct cash transfers to benefi-
ciary bank accounts. On financial matters, in addition 
to launching a new financial inclusion scheme to ensure 
every Indian household has a bank account, the govern-
ment ratified a new inflation-targeting framework and 
continued the UPA government’s efforts to revamp the 
legal and regulatory framework for India’s financial 
sector. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the govern-
ment also attempted to amend a contentious 2013 law 
governing land acquisition in order to ease the path for 
industry to obtain land. 
 A number of other reforms remain pending but 
are cause for optimism. The most consequential is ar-
guably the creation of a new Goods and Services Tax 
(GST), which would reduce barriers to trade and com-
merce occurring across states. Other reforms on the 
Source: Author
Figure 2: Status of Key Reforms to Date
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5ing “single window” clearance for businesses looking to 
make large capital investments. Modi has demonstrated 
both proclivities in his first eighteen months in Delhi. 
 Second and related to the point above, it is not im-
mediately obvious that Modi or his closest advisors have 
a clearly defined reform strategy. As a result, there is 
a tendency to change tack when opposed. For example, 
many Finance Ministry officials have long advocated for 
the government to establish an independent debt man-
agement agency to separate debt management from mon-
etary policy management, thereby resolving an inherent 
conflict of interest faced by the RBI. The government had 
included such a provision in its 2015 Finance Bill and pub-
lically announced its intention to push for it, but changed 
course just days later when objections were raised.  
 Even if one dismisses the notion that the government 
does not have a well-articulated reform vision, Modi’s own 
statements suggest a third possible constraint: a belief 
that his government has plenty of time. Indeed, Modi has 
openly dismissed talk of “100 day” agendas or even one or 
five-year agendas, remarking that he will need ten years 
(or two, five-year terms) to “bring India into the 21st cen-
tury.” If Modi is operating with a two or even three-term 
time horizon, it makes more sense that he has chosen not 
to front load drastic changes into his first years in office, 
but instead pursue gradual change spread out over the 
long haul. This inclination is likely further strengthened 
by the widespread perception that the BJP’s unexpected 
loss in the 2004 general election was a result of moving 
too quickly on reforms while in office.
 Alongside Modi’s agenda, it is important to keep in 
mind that the BJP is a big tent party. It contains free mar-
keteers who advocate for liberal economics, nativists who 
endorse the principles of swadeshi (self-sufficiency) and 
preach the gospel of gau raksha (cow protection), and 
people at every position in between these poles. The Modi 
government is constantly walking a tightrope. If it push-
es too hard on reforms, its nationalist supporters – many 
of Rajya Sabha seats by the end of the Modi government’s 
first term, it will have to perform exceedingly well in 
upcoming state elections. The imperative to improve the 
party’s performance at the state level, however, imposes 
a cost on policy-making as it heightens the pressures im-
posed by the electoral calendar.  
 Another check on the executive is India’s indepen-
dent judiciary. In two recent high-profile cases, judicial 
rulings have curtailed the government’s reform impulse. 
First, in 2014, Parliament and a majority of state assem-
blies ratified an important (though controversial) insti-
tutional reform, amending the Constitution to create a 
new National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) 
to replace the opaque collegium system that is presently 
responsible for the appointment of the higher judiciary. 
While the government touted the NJAC as a way of fix-
ing a broken appointments process, the Supreme Court 
struck the amendment down on constitutional grounds. 
A second high-profile case involves the government’s de-
sire to use citizens’ Aadhaar numbers to deliver subsidies 
and welfare benefits. The Supreme Court has balked at 
making the biometric scheme mandatory for any benefits 
transfers, although a recent interim ruling permits its 
voluntary use for a narrow set of government programs.
Internal constraints
The veto points inherent in Indian democracy are widely 
acknowledged. The many impediments to economic re-
forms that exist within the ruling alliance itself, however, 
have received less attention. At least four merit mention. 
 For starters, it is not clear that Modi believes sweep-
ing policy reform is necessary. As chief minister of Gu-
jarat, Modi consistently emphasized two important, but 
less dramatic priorities: efficiency and infrastructure cre-
ation. Rather than dismantling public sector units (PSUs) 
in Gujarat, Modi sought to professionalize their manage-
ment and make them more efficient. He also earned plau-
dits for overhauling Gujarat’s infrastructure and provid-
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new initiative to rank the “ease of doing business” within 
states. It also used its authority under Article 254(2) of 
the Indian Constitution to allow states to experiment with 
legislative changes on issues concurrently governed by 
the states and the center. Exercising this authority essen-
tially devolves rule-making to the state level on thorny is-
sues of labor and land reform in the hopes that successful 
policy experiments will attract copycat reforms. To date, 
the BJP-ruled states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh 
have both used this opening to ease rigid labor laws. Us-
ing his bully pulpit, Modi can go even further by exhort-
ing BJP states to adopt a “common minimum program” on 
economic reforms, moving in lockstep to amend legisla-
tion under state or concurrent jurisdiction.
 Second, in the coming years the government faces a fi-
nancial dilemma: it needs to consolidate its fiscal position 
to please markets, but will simultaneously be pressured 
to increase public expenditures, both on infrastructure 
and to cover new fiscal burdens imposed on it by the re-
cent report of a government pay commission that sets gov-
ernment salaries. One obvious solution, as articulated by 
economist Sajjid Chinoy, is to sell government assets and 
channel some of the proceeds of this disinvestment into 
public spending. This would essentially act as an asset 
swap by redirecting public monies from PSUs to produc-
tive public infrastructure. The government could use this 
externally imposed dilemma as a politically convenient 
alibi to make such changes. To date, the government has 
announced ambitious plans to sell government assets, but 
implementation has been fitful.
 Third, the goal of returning India to a sustainable high 
rate of growth implicitly requires upgrading the quality 
of public sector institutions. Unfortunately, the govern-
ment is guilty of both sins of commission and omission 
on this front. Regarding the former, upon taking office 
Modi moved quickly to centralize power within the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO). While reinstating the authority 
and legitimacy of the PMO was necessary after its cred-
of whom are affiliated with the BJP’s ideological parent, 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – threaten to 
launch protests or sit out the next election. But if the gov-
ernment leans too far in a nationalist direction, it risks 
losing its pro-business adherents. By splitting the differ-
ence, it aims to keep everyone happy.
Looking ahead
In 2015, the BJP’s electoral juggernaut encountered seri-
ous roadblocks. After losing February’s state election in 
Delhi to the upstart Aam Aadmi Party, in November the 
party was decimated by the opposition in the state of Bi-
har. The BJP’s inability to wrest control of the state – in 
spite of Modi leading the campaign – accentuates the in-
ternal and external constraints the prime minister faces 
in at least three ways. 
 First, Bihar has an important role to play in India’s 
federal power structure, not least because it has sixteen 
seats in the Rajya Sabha, control over which the BJP des-
perately needs. In addition, Bihar also serves as the literal 
and metaphorical gateway to eastern India, a tract of Indi-
an territory into which the BJP is eager to expand. Finally, 
the outcome is personally damaging to Modi’s prestige, 
given how intently he campaigned for the party. This loss 
of face could complicate his control over the party appa-
ratus and imperil future attempts to rein in nationalist 
elements of his base, whose actions distract from a sharp 
focus on the economy. In sum, the Bihar result increases 
the likelihood that Modi will adhere to his gradualist re-
form course. But even within the framework of incremen-
talism, there remain several unrealized opportunities. 
 First, the Modi government has adopted a new and re-
freshing approach on federalism. This approach empha-
sizes center-state cooperation as well as heightened inter-
state competition. To facilitate the former, the government 
scrapped the decades-old Planning Commission and in-
creased the share of central revenue devolved directly 
to the states. For the latter, the government launched a 
7climate, subsidy reform, natural resource policies and fi-
nance/monetary reforms. 
 Given the array of external and internal constraints 
on the government, further enhanced by recent election 
defeats, the Modi government is unlikely to deviate from 
its gradualist path. Even operating within its comfort 
zone, the Modi government can use India’s federal system 
to push reform at the state level and leverage externally 
imposed constraints to alter its public finance priorities. 
In truth, the most fundamental reforms – those relating 
to administration and governance – represent the most 
efficacious long-term investment the government can 
make. If Modi were to embrace this agenda, it would truly 
mark the arrival of acche din.
ibility had badly eroded under the previous government, 
centralizing power within the PMO runs the risk of creat-
ing new bottlenecks and distortions. Second, the govern-
ment has often exerted political influence in places where 
it should not, such as intervening in the functioning of 
higher-education institutes and rewarding political cro-
nies with plum positions in government or quasi-govern-
ment entities. Nearly every Indian government in recent 
memory has followed a similar playbook, but this is also 
why they have all done a disservice to governance. 
 Aside from these missteps, the government has also 
missed obvious opportunities to take action on public 
sector reform. In 2013, Parliament passed a bill to create 
a national anti-corruption ombudsman, or Lokpal, but 
the Modi government has yet to implement the legisla-
tion. The Central Information Commission (CIC) ruled 
that political parties are subject to the Right to Infor-
mation Act, which would, for the first time, introduce 
a modicum of transparency into the opaque affairs of 
India’s parties. The present government, despite Modi’s 
pledges to reduce corruption and malfeasance in poli-
tics, has refused to accept the CIC’s ruling. Indeed, the 
BJP joined five other national parties in refusing to even 
appear before the CIC.
Conclusion
The Modi government is eighteen months young. It wisely 
prioritized macroeconomic stabilization in its initial pe-
riod in office to stem the economic malaise it inherited, 
and the decision to do so has paid off handsomely: while 
India’s economy still has its vulnerabilities, it is in mark-
edly better position to weather global economic head-
winds than was the case just two years ago. On the broad-
er economic reform agenda, however, the government’s 
record is open to constructive criticism. While its attempt 
to ease stringent land acquisition legislation failed, the 
government has successfully implemented important, al-
beit incremental, changes with respect to the investment 
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